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Abstract 
Financial sustainability in local government remains a pressing problem which has seen a 
host of public policy interventions, including compulsory consolidation and performance 
monitoring through financial sustainability ratios. In September 2014, the New South Wales 
(NSW) Government announced a reform program centred on increasing scale in local 
government to make councils ‘fit for the future’. We apply factor analysis to the ten financial 
ratios informing the NSW Government’s reform initiative to identify the underlying factors 
for observed financial performance data. We find evidence indicating that three independent 
underlying factors account for the adopted measures of financial sustainability. The public 
policy implication arising from this study suggests that the reforms imposed by the NSW 
Government on NSW municipalities may only meet with limited success. 
 
 






The financial sustainability of local government continues to be a cause of great concern for 
regulators in Australia and abroad (Dollery et al. 2012). In an effort to monitor the financial 
problems which many municipalities face regulators are increasingly turning to financial ratio 
analysis (Drew and Dollery, 2013a). Yet just monitoring the decline of municipal fortunes is, 
in itself, unlikely to improve matters. What regulators and municipal executives need to know 
is why the financial sustainability of councils continues to deteriorate. One way of seeking to 
answer this question is to conduct multiple regression analysis to identify the determinants of 
the various financial ratios. However, this empirical approach has largely gone unrewarded 
owing inter alia to the need for a priori specification of regressors and functional form. By 
way of contrast, factor analysis (a technique which appears not to have previously been 
employed in the corpus of local government literature) offers a window into the latent factors 
responsible for the observed data – irrespective of whether they are currently able to be 
quantified. The incremental knowledge thus accrued can then assist regulators and public 
policy architects in their attempt to arrest the decline in municipal financial sustainability. 
Despite the absence of an adequate empirical foundation, policy makers across the globe have 
assumed causes for local government financial sustainability problems. For example, the 
British Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) program presumed management and 
leadership factors underpinned fiscal viability problems (Wilson 2004; Boyne and Enticott 
2004). In New South Wales (NSW) local government the recent Independent Local 
Government Review Panel (ILGRP) assumed scale problems largely induced financial 
unsustainability (ILGRP 2013). This presumption that insufficient scale is responsible for the 
NSW local government financial sustainability predicament has now been promoted to the 
central thesis behind the NSW Government’s ‘Fit for the Future’ local government reform 
program (Office of Local Government, 2014).  
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However, it is highly unlikely that only a single factor causes financial sustainability 
problems. If all of the factors responsible for the observed financial sustainability data are not 
identified and addressed, then it is probable that public policy intervention will only meet 
with limited success. Given the significant cost, disruption and division involved in structural 
reforms, council consolidation should proceed only if it has a high probability of succeeding. 
Moreover, if latent factors driving financial performance are interdependent then this should 
be considered in policy formulation. In the latter case, public policies mistakenly directed at a 
single cause may result in unintended consequences or simply be ineffective.  
Drawing on 2011 NSW local government data, in this paper we apply factor analysis to 
determine the number and degree of interaction for hypothesised underlying latent factors 
associated with financial sustainability measures. In this analysis we take as given the ability 
of the financial sustainability ratios developed by the Treasury Corporation of NSW (TCorp 
2013) to measure sustainability and we do thus not provide a critique of these ratios. 
Moreover, the local government reform agenda is principally motivated by the ten financial 
ratios and success is defined as having councils achieve thresholds on a subset of the ratios 
(office of Local Government (OLG) 2014)
1
.  
2. Accounting Ratios and Financial Sustainability in NSW Local Government 
The NSW Government established the ILGRP (2013: 4) in March 2012 to ‘improve the 
strength and effectiveness of local government’. As part of its remit, the ILGRP focused on 
strengthening the financial sustainability of NSW local government. The NSW government 
requested TCorp to prepare Financial Sustainability Reports for each of the 152 NSW local 
authorities which were then used extensively by the Panel. Given the pivotal importance of 
financial sustainability in the deliberations of the ILGRP, completed reports were sought 
                                                          
1
 A detailed appraisal of the TCorp financial ratios is provided by Drew and Dollery (2013a). 
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within a twelve month period. This vexing timeframe saw TCorp draw heavily on the work of 
the Queensland Treasury Corporation (QTC) which had produced regular financial 
sustainability reports on Queensland local authorities since July 2007 (TCorp 2013: 20). The 
TCorp Financial Sustainability Reports calculated ten financial sustainability ratios for NSW 
councils, classified under two broad categories: Financial Flexibility (Operating ratio and 
Own Source Operating Revenue ratio, Cash Expense, Unrestricted Current, Debt Service 
Cover and Interest Cover ratios) and Asset Renewal and Capital Works (Infrastructure 
Backlog, Asset Maintenance, Asset Renewal and Capital Expenditure ratios). 
The ten ratios were then summarised as a single financial sustainability assessment ranging 
through ‘very weak’, ‘weak’, ‘moderate’, ‘sound’, ‘strong’ to ‘very strong’. Five councils 
were assessed as ‘very weak’, including the Central Darling Council which was later placed 
under administration. A further 34 municipalities were assessed as ‘weak’, 79 as ‘moderate’, 
32 as ‘sound’ and only two councils as ‘strong’. No municipalities were assessed to be ‘very 
strong’. All of the ‘very weak’ councils are classified as rural. Moreover, almost a quarter of 
the rural councils were assessed as ‘weak’, compared with 16% of metropolitan 
municipalities.  
An empirical analysis of the relationship between financial sustainability and the TCorp 
ratios by Drew and Dollery (2013a) found only limited evidence of statistically significant 
associations with a comprehensive set of regressors that included population variables, socio-
economic indicators, demographic descriptors and infrastructure data. However, it should be 
noted that regression estimations, such as those performed by Drew and Dollery (2013a), 
cannot identify unmeasured or unmeasurable latent factors. Moreover, a single regression 
model cannot identify which latent constructs are responsible for specific data or ascertain the 
interaction between underlying factors. Factor analysis can overcome these issues when used 
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in an exploratory fashion by identifying both the number of latent constructs and how 
financial ratios load on the factors.  
The NSW Government’s response to the ILGRP Final Report (2013) was issued by the 
Office of Local Government (OLG) in September 2014. Entitled Fit for the Future, its formal 
policy included a package totalling $271 million to support councils to engage in large-scale 
mergers. In addition, local authorities have been given to the end of the current financial year 
2014/15 to prepare detailed plans on how they meet Fit for the Future criteria and how they 
intend to improve performance to become ‘fit for the future’. In this regard, while not 
prescribing forced amalgamation, the NSW Government has repeatedly claimed that ‘for 
some councils joining forces with their neighbour may be the best option’ (OLG 2014: 12).  
Councils assessed to be ‘fit for the future’ will have access ‘to a range of opportunities, 
including cheaper finance options, simplified reporting requirements, priority access to State 
funding and grants and options for additional planning powers’ (OLG 2014: 12). Councils not 
deemed by the ‘independent experts’ to be ‘fit for the future’ will be referred to the Minister 
for unspecified action. According to Fit for the Future documentation, the first step for a 
council to assess their fitness is to decide whether they have sufficient scale and capacity. If 
this is not the case, then they are referred to the structural change ‘roadmap’ broadly 
consistent with the ILGRP Report recommendations. The ILGRP recommended some 63 
local authorities be merged into 20 new entities.  
If councils are deemed to have sufficient scale, then they must meet benchmarks for six of 
the TCorp financial ratios (Operating, Own Source, Asset Renewal, Infrastructure Backlog, 
Asset Maintenance, and Debt) and an undefined benchmark for Real Operating Expenditure 
over five years. No reason has been provided as to why four of the TCorp ratios fully 
endorsed by the ILGRP and which the NSW Government has committed to in other 
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publications, such as Comparative Information on NSW Local Government – Measuring 
Local Government Performance (Department of Local Government 2014), are not required in 
the Fit for the Future proposals. One possibility resides in the fact that it is clear that most 
local authorities already met the benchmarks set by TCorp for two of the omitted ratios.  
It is clear that accounting ratios lie at the heart of the NSW local government reform agenda 
and that both the ILGRP and NSW Government have determined that scale factors represent 
the single most important element driving the TCorp financial ratios. It need hardly be added 
that this is an empirical (and not conceptual) question which can only be settled by recourse 
to the data. However, to date no empirical evaluation of the latent factors driving the 
observed financial ratio data has been undertaken in NSW local government. This motivates 
the analysis presented in this paper. 
Factor analysis is the technique most suited to answering this question because it (i) can test 
the association between variables and unmeasured or unmeasurable latent factors; (ii) does 
not require a priori assumptions; (iii) is not as sensitive as regression analysis to the quantum 
or choice of ratios chosen to exemplify financial sustainability; and (iv) aims to uncover the 
number and relationship of hypothesised latent factors. Thus factor analysis focuses on 
elucidating the underlying constructs that produce the observed data, rather than simply 
measuring and describing the association between different financial ratios.  
To invoke a medical analogy; if we accept the TCorp, ILGRP and NSW Government 
contention that NSW local government is ‘sick’, then factor analysis seeks to illuminate the 
underlying cause of the symptoms, whereas correlation or regression analysis merely 
attempts to determine whether observed symptoms are associated with the purported disease. 
If the intent of local government reform is to make NSW local government ‘healthy’, then it 
would be best if policy makers understood the underlying constructs of the observed TCorp 
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(2013) financial ratio data. This process in turn involves an appreciation of the literature on 
local government performance so that it might be applied to the identification of latent factors 
elucidated. 
3. Theoretical Perspectives on Financial Sustainability in Local Government 
In general, two major theoretical perspectives have been used to explain the financial 
performance of local government: (a) arguments centred on the scale of local authorities and 
(b) arguments premised on the existence of so-called external disability factors typically 
outside the discretion of municipal managers, which include demographic structure, 
socioeconomic factors, an inadequate revenue base and the like. In the Australian milieu, 
scale arguments have dominated policy discourse, even where stark evidence to the contrary 
has been presented (Drew and Dollery 2013b). 
Put simply, scale economies are present when average total costs of production decrease as 
output expands (Ferguson 1969). It is held that most production units typically experience 
economies of scale, followed by constant returns to scale, and then diseconomies of scale. 
Scale economies arise due to the benefits of specialisation, improved purchasing power, 
greater utilisation of plant and other factors. By contrast, diseconomies of scale occur due 
largely to the greater complexities of managing bigger production units (Ferguson 1969).   
Empirical evidence on scale economies in local government is mixed (see Dollery et al. 2012 
for a survey of the international empirical literature). Moreover, in the Australian local 
government context, Byrnes and Dollery (2002) concluded that most Australian empirical 
work had been mis-specfied to such a degree that ‘it has been possible to conclude that no 
satisfactory Australian study has yet been conducted into economies of scale in municipal 
service provision’ (Byrnes and Dollery 2002: 404). However, more recent Australian work 
suggests that economies of scale may not be as dominant a determinant of municipal 
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performance in Australia as previously thought (see, for instance, Drew et al. 2013a; Drew 
and Dollery 2013b, Drew et al. 2012; Drew et al. 2013b). 
Disability factors in local government cover a host of demographic and socio-economic 
indicators, such as the age profile of a local government area, wage levels, and formal 
education qualifications, as well as physical characteristics, like climatic considerations, 
distance to large centres, and topography. It is hypothesised in the literature that disability 
factors place greater demands on local government services and hence impose more acute 
budgetary pressures. This is supported by a body of empirical evidence. For example, 
Andrews et al. (2005: 653) concluded that ‘local government service performance is 
consistently constrained by external circumstances’. Similarly, a study by Boyne et al. (2001: 
875) suggested that ‘local budgetary outcomes are constrained by movements in workloads, 
as measured by service needs, and munificence, as measured by financial resources’. 
Disability factors have been considered determinants of local government performance in 
American work by Fisher (1961) and more recently Holcombe and Williams (2008). 
However, despite the frequent use of exogenous variables as disability factors in Australian 
econometric modelling, there is no direct evidence that it is associated with service need in 
local government. Indeed, given the limited ‘services to property’ service responsibilities of 
Australian municipalities, with few ‘services to people’ obligations, it is far from certain that 
socio-economic disability factors are a major determinant of council performance. However, 
given the wave of performance monitoring sweeping through the Australian local 
government sector (TCorp 2013; Department of Local Government, Community Recovery 
and Resilience 2013), there is a pressing need to establish empirically whether disability 
factors are in fact a significant cost driver in Australian local government. 
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Whilst scale and disability factors have dominated much of the empirical literature, recent 
work has underlined the potential for management capacity to influence local government 
performance. For instance, in a survey of municipal officers Boyne and Enticott (2004) found 
that staff in poorly performing councils believed that senior management and political leaders 
did little to drive performance improvement, which contrasted starkly with the assessments of 
officers working at ‘excellent’ and ‘good’ local authorities. In addition, in an empirical 
investigation of the effect of external constraints on municipal performance, Andrews et al. 
(2005: 654) suggested that it was ‘equally plausible that the behaviour and choices of local 
policy-makers are the missing part of the performance equation.’ Largely due to data 
availability problems, this emerging hypothesis for local government performance has 
remained untested in the Australian context. 
4. Empirical Technique 
Peterson (2000: 262) has observed that ‘simply stated the objective of factor analysis is 
analytical parsimony tempered with interpretative plausibility’. Factor analysis examines the 
covariation between observations in order to identify unmeasured linear composite latent 
factors (Kim and Mueller 1978). It may be used in an exploratory fashion ‘a means of 
exploring the underlying factor structure without prior specification of number of factors and 
their loading’ (Kim and Mueller 1978: 85), or alternatively in order to reduce a large number 
of variables into a more manageable set or index. Given that our objective in this paper is to 
investigate how many underlying factors exist and the nature of the hypothesised latent 
constructs, our analysis is exploratory in nature. While we draw on extant economic theory, 
we make no a priori assumptions as to whether theory is relevant in the NSW municipal 
context. Moreover, determining the number of latent constructs is a critical matter given that 
the NSW state government response to the ILGRP recommendations gives primacy to just 
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one factor (i.e. scale), and the presence of additional factors or interactions between factors 
may well determine the success of the NSW local government reform process. 
This paper uses the Principal Factor approach - rather than the Principal Component approach 
which invokes the crucial assumption that all variance can be assumed to be attributable to 
the common factors only. The analysis examines co-variation between financial sustainability 
ratios for the 118 (of 152) NSW municipalities which had complete data sets at the time of 
writing (as per the TCorp (2012) Report). Three tests were then applied to ascertain the 
number of major factors: Kaiser’s rule, Cattell’s Scree test and comparison with theory 
(consistent with Willis et al. 2005). Table 1 provides a summary of the data used and 
definitions of financial sustainability ratios. A brief discussion of the merits of these tests is 
apposite given the critical policy implications associated with the number of latent constructs 
elucidated.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Kaisers rule (K1) is undoubtedly the most popular method for determining the number of 
hypothetical latent factors, despite some empirical evidence suggesting that it performs rather 
poorly (Hayton et al. 2004). However, much of the criticism can be traced to misconceptions 
regarding its analytical foundations since it is often used as a rule for determining the 
definitive number of latent factors rather than the upper bound (Zwick and Velicer 1986). 
Users also tend to ignore the fact that Guttman’s proof of factor prediction certainty is based 
on the population correlation matrix and not the sample. In this regard, Hayton et al. (2004: 
193) observed that ‘for finite samples, sampling error adds to the rank of a given correlation 
matrix, and thus the K1 criterion may tend to overestimate the number of factors’. 
Part of the attraction of Kaiser’s rule resides in its simplicity: major latent factors are 
identified as those with eigenvalues (the amount of variance accounted for by each factor) 
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exceeding 1. Moreover, many of the criticisms can be ameliorated by applying 
complementary tests, such as Cattell’s Scree test (which plots eigenvalues against the number 
of factors and seeks to determine the point at which a scree develops as a result of relatively 
small variances prompted by minor factors), surveying significant proportions of the entire 
population and recognising that K1 only indicates the highest number of major hypothesised 
latent factors (and that a smaller number may nonetheless exist). In our case, approximately 
80% of NSW councils are represented in the factor analysis.  
The next major objective of our analysis was to determine the degree of interaction between 
latent factors. In this regard, both orthogonal rotations (suggesting independence) and oblique 
rotations (indicating correlations between factors) were conducted in response to Merenda 
(1997). If similar results were obtained, then orthogonal relationships could be posited, 
whereas dissimilar results would suggest oblique associations between factors. This point is 
important in a public policy context because any action intended to address any one of the 
underlying factors causing the observed data may have significant unintended consequences 
if the factors are interdependent. 
Finally, the nature of the latent factors was hypothesised on the basis of how the financial 
sustainability ratios loaded on each factor. In this regard, the significant loadings were 
considered to be at a minimum 0.40 in response to Peterson (2000) who criticised the 
common cut-off of 0.30 after noting that it is the loading squared which contributes to 
variance. Moreover, using a higher threshold avoids the occurrence of ‘complex’ factors and 
hence eases interpretability, although it is important to remain cognisant of the fact that ratios 
noted for each factor are the dominant loadings and that other less significant loadings are 
also constituents of the reported Factors. The sign of the loading was also considered wherein 
a negative loading indicated the factor produced causation in the opposite direction to other 
loadings. We also employed cross-section regressions in one instance to confirm whether the 
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latent construct assigned - predicated on theoretical considerations - was supported by 
econometric evidence. This was particularly appropriate given the emphasis placed on scale 
by both the ILGRP (2013) and OLG(2014) and the fact that recourse has long been made to 
econometric evidence to ascertain whether economies of scale exist in local government 
(Drew, Kortt and Dollery 2012).  
5. Number of Latent Factors 
Eigenvalues for the unrotated factor solutions are detailed in Table 2. As we can see, the 
eigenvalues suggest a maximum of three major latent factors for the observed data under the 
K1 criterion: it is not reasonable to eliminate the three factor solution on a trivial deviance 
from an eigenvalue of 1. However, as detailed in section 3, this result does not eliminate the 
possibility of two or one latent factors, the latter representing the implied position of the 
NSW Government. To move beyond this upper bound result, a Scree test was then employed. 
This test suggests that three major latent factors explain most of the covariation in the 
observed data. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
There are two additional reasons for rejecting the possibility of one or two solutions which 
would be otherwise equally compatible with the K1 result. Firstly, the weight of scholarly 
literature on scale effects is consistent with Factor 2: acceptance of this implies at least two 
factors. It is worthwhile noting that the two factor solution still contains loadings very similar 
to Factor 1. Finally, the loadings on Factor 3 are consistent with a management explanation 
which is in turn consistent with some existing empirical evidence (Boyne and Enticott, 2004). 
Moreover, it makes intuitive sense that management decisions would influence municipal 
financial sustainability: only if the decisions of electoral representatives and senior 
management had consistently insignificant pecuniary implications could one argue against its 
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inclusion as a latent factor. However, it would be reasonable, on the basis of the analysis, to 
suggest that the Factor 3 had less explanatory power than the first two. 
Public policy implications arising from the results are significant. The NSW Government 
response to the ILGRP (2013) Report requires councils to submit their ‘fit for the future’ 
proposals by June 2015. The foremost criterion assessing the ‘fit for the future’ status of a 
given council is scale. Should a council not have ‘adequate’ scale, then it is directed to the 
‘Structural Change Roadmap’, which would set in train an amalgamation to achieve the 
minimum population size decreed by the ILGRP. If a council does have adequate scale, then 
it is directed to address the subordinate criteria of sustainability, efficiency and effective 
infrastructure and service management. While scale is being used as a principal determinant 
of whether a council will be assessed as ‘fit for the future’ the analysis indicates that there are 
an additional two major underlying factors that should be considered. 
6. Nature of Latent Factors 
Table 3 describes the factor loadings for each of the three major hypothetical latent factors. 
Both orthogonal and oblique rotations are reported for comparative purposes. The close 
similarity between the two solutions indicates that the orthogonal rotation is satisfactory. 
What this means is that our evidence indicates that the latent factors are largely independent. 
This has implications for public policy formulation since it suggests that action taken to 
ameliorate the effects of a single latent factor, such as a boundary change to address scale 
factors, is unlikely to affect the other causes of local government financial sustainability, like 
management factors. As a result, there is limited scope for regulatory intervention to produce 
unintended consequences. However, it also means that policy intervention addressing just one 
factor – in the current NSW case the scale factor - may meet with limited success since two 
of the major latent constructs driving the observed data are not addressed by the reform 
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program. In order to secure significant improvements, the evidence indicates that policy 
intervention should be tailored to address all three major latent factors simultaneously. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 3 provides details of how the TCorp (2012) ratios load on each of the three factors 
identified. Notably, the dominant loadings for each factor are unique which assists in the 
interpretation of the latent constructs. Moreover, complex factors have been entirely avoided. 
Factor 1 loads most heavily on the two ratios which deal solely with debt. This means that we 
can deduce that Factor 1 predominantly causes changes in debt ratios, but has relatively little 
effect on other observed indicators (such as annualised operating results). The fact that the 
two observed debt ratios are driven by the same latent construct is in itself not a surprising 
result. However, the absence of the same two ratios from the significant loading summary of 
the other Factors is quite significant: the highest loading for these two ratios on Factor 2 is 
0.12 and for Factor 3 is 0.01. This indicates that the observed financial ratios relating to debt 
are principally the measured outcome of just a single independent latent construct and that 
policy intervention taken in relation to other latent factors will not result in any discernible 
improvement to the debt ratios. The construct that best explains the observed loadings 
suggests a largely unreported cause of financial sustainability is the effect of past decisions.  
These inherited problems refer to the accumulated impact of previous budgetary outcomes 
and expenditure commitments and manifests itself as long-term debt. It is consistent with the 
empirical evidence of Boyne et al. (2001: 875) who observed that ‘external pressures and the 
legacy of previous budgetary decisions are major drivers of expenditure change.’ This 
explanation suggests that councils burdened with high levels of debt will struggle to achieve 
financial sustainability. It is important to note that these ratios reflect the accumulation of 
earlier budgetary outcomes over a number of years whilst the remaining financial flexibility 
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ratios (operating, own source, unrestricted current and cash expense ratios) predominantly 
reflect events limited to the current financial year. It is thus quite possible that inherited 
problems from the past might be reflected in poor debt ratios, but may not be indicated in the 
other financial flexibility indicators for a given year. 
The second factor is hypothesised to be caused by economies of scale and density. The first 
indication that a scale explanation is warranted is the high loading on the own source ratio 
(loading in the opposite direction to the Unrestricted, Cash Expense and Asset Maintenance 
ratios). In Australia, fiscal equalisation grants, which represent the major component of ‘other 
source’ revenue, are based heavily on population measures and spatial remoteness criteria 
(correlated strongly with density) (Drew and Dollery 2013a). This thus suggests the 
possibility of economies of scale and density. Confirmation of this hypothesis can be 
provided by recourse to econometric evidence – if economies of scale and density are indeed 
the best explanation for the factor then it would be reasonable to expect that population size, 
number of employing businesses and population density would be statistically significant 
regressors for econometric models employing the dominant factor loadings (for Factor 2) as 
regressands
2
. In this regard it is noteworthy that three of the four linear models report 
population size as a significant regressor, and that the two models with the highest coefficient 
of determination also report density as a significant determinant. Finally, the weight of 
empirical literature supports the contention that scale effects will have a direct impact on 
municipal liquidity (cash expense and unrestricted ratios) (see, for instance, Jones and Walker 
(2007)).  
                                                          
2
 The full specification of regressors is as follows: population size, population density, average wage, 
proportion of individuals over 65 years of age, length of roads (in kms), proportion of individuals from a non-
englsih speaking background, proportion of individuals identifying as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, 
number of employing businesses and the proportion of individuals under 15 years of age. This is consonant 
with the models employed by Drew and Dollery 2013a, 2013b. 
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In summary, scale (but not density) has been identified by the ILGRP and the NSW 
Government as the preeminent factor determining a council’s ‘fitness’ for the future. 
However, the findings of this paper present hitherto unconsidered complications for the NSW 
local government reform process. In essence, scale is just one of three factors driving the 
observed financial ratio data and yet the NSW Government’s attempt to improve financial 
sustainability seems to largely ignore the other two independent latent constructs. Whereas 
there is access to cheaper finance for ‘fit for the future’ councils, there is nonetheless no 
suggestion that the NSW Government will pay down debt. Secondly, economies of density 
are also indicated by our analysis and it is difficult to see how council mergers can address 
population density directly. The final matter to note is that the eigenvalue for this factor 
suggests it is not the construct responsible for the majority of the observed variance. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The final factor is only marginally categorised as a major latent identity. It loads heavily on 
the operating ratio, asset renewal ratio and capital expenditure ratio. All three ratios are 
directly affected by annualised decisions taken by senior municipal managers: we can thus 
expect this effect will be greater than for other ratios, such as infrastructure backlog and debt 
ratios, which are determined by cumulative effects over many years, or the own source ratio, 
which is determined by exogenous factors. For example, the asset renewal ratio and capital 
expenditure are both the direct results of two actions: in the first instance decisions on the 
quantum of asset renewal and capital investment, and more contentiously in the second 
instance, decisions regarding the remaining effective life and residual value of non-current 
assets (which are translated into depreciation values) (see, for instance, Drew and Dollery 
2014). Similarly, the operating ratio involves a number of conscious decisions relating to 
expenditure and revenue for which there are annualised consequences. In section 2, the 
emerging empirical evidence supporting a management hypothesis was presented. 
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Unfortunately, there is a paucity of Australian evidence relating to the effect of senior 
management on municipal performance due to a lack of available data. 7.  
Concluding Remarks 
By the end of June 2015, all NSW councils will have to submit their proposals on how they 
will be ‘fit for the future’. The preeminent factor used to determine fitness will be appropriate 
scale. Yet in this paper, our empirical analysis shows that there are three – and not one - 
major latent factors driving the observed financial sustainability ratios which prompted the 
reform process in the first place. Moreover, we have established that the three factors – scale 
and density, legacy, and management competency - act largely independently. 
This result should be of considerable interest to public policymakers. Under the present 
policy trajectory, the best case scenario is that the NSW Government reform program may 
have relatively little impact on the measures of financial sustainability adopted by the 
government, owing to the fact that two of the major latent constructs have gone largely 
unaddressed. By contrast, the worst case scenario is that the specific combinations of 
municipal mergers recommended by the ILGRP will not improve the financial ratios at all 
(see Drew and Dollery 2013a). These outcomes should be set against the ‘investment’ of ‘up 
to $1 billion’ (OLG 2014: 4), severe disruption to local government functioning, distress 
caused to affected staff, and unnecessary community division.  
It may be objected that other explanations may exist for the nature of hypothesised latent 
factors. However, we have only proposed the strongest hypotheses on the basis of existing 
supporting evidence. The task now is to replicate this empirical method in other local 
government systems for comparative purposes, as well as conducting alternative studies 
designed to test each specific hypothesis. Further empirical evidence may uncover alternate 
explanations or contrasting factor interactions which could well explain why public policy 
 18 
 






Andrews R., G. Boyne, J. Law, and Walker, R. 2005, ‘External Constraints on Local Service 
Standards: The Case of Comprehensive Performance Assessment in English Local 
Government’, Public Administration, 83, 3: 639-656. 
Boyne G., R. Ashworth, and Powell, M. 2001, ‘Environmental Change, Leadership 
Succession and Incrementalism in Local Government’, Journal of Management Studies, 38, 
6: 859-878. 
Boyne G., and Enticott, G. 2004, ‘Are the Poor Different? The Internal Characteristics of 
Local Authorities in the Five Comprehensive Performance Assessment Groups’, Public 
Money & Management, 24, 1: 11-18. 
Byrnes J., and Dollery, B. 2002, ‘Do Economies of Scale Exist in Australian Local 
Government? A Review of the Research Evidence1’, Urban Policy and Research, 20, 4: 391-
414. 
Department of Local Government Community Resilience and Recovery (DLGCRR) 2013, 
Financial Management (Sustainability) Guideline, DLGCRR, Brisbane. 
Dollery, B. E., Crase, L. and Johnson, A. 2006, Australian Local Government Economics, 
Sydney, University of New South Wales Press. 
Dollery B., B. Grant and Kortt, M. 2012, Councils in Cooperation - Shared Services and 
Australian Local Government, Federation Press, Sydney. 
Drew J., and Dollery, B. 2013a, ‘Is The Game Worth The Candle? Estimating the Impact of 
the Proposed Greater Sydney Metropolitan Amalgamations on Municipal Financial 
Sustainability’, Public Money & Management In Print. 
Drew J., and Dollery, B. 2013b, ‘Would Bigger Councils Yield Scale Economies in the 
Greater Perth Metropolitan Region? A Critique of the Metropolitan Local Government 
Review for Perth Local Government’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, In Print. 
 20 
 
Drew, J. and Dollery, B. 2014, ‘Inconsistent Depreciation Practice and Public Policymaking:  
Local Government Reform in New South Wales’, Australian Accounting Review, In Print. 
Drew J., M. Kortt and Dollery, B. 2012, ‘Economies of Scale and Local Government 
Expenditure: Evidence from Australia’, Administration & Society OnlineFirst. 
Drew J., M. Kortt and Dollery, B. 2013a, ‘A Cautionary Tale: Council Amalgamations in 
Tasmania and the Deloitte Access Economics Report’, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 72, 1: 55-65. 
Drew J., M. Kortt, and Dollery, B. 2013b, ‘Did the Big Stick Work? An Empirical 
Assessment of Scale Economies and the Queensland Forced Amalgamation Program’, Local 
Government Studies, In Print. 
Ferguson C. 1969, Neoclassical Theory of Production and Distribution, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Fisher G. 1961, ‘Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary 
Analysis’, National Tax Journal, 14, 4: 349-355. 
Hayton J., D. Allen and Scarpello, V. 2004, ‘Factor Retention Decisions in Exploratory 
Factor Analysis: A Tutorial on Parallel Analysis’, Organizational Research Methods, 7, 2: 
191-205. 
Holcombe R., and Williams, D. 2008, ‘The Impact of Population Density on Municipal 
Government Expenditures’, Public Finance Review, 36, 3: 359-373. 
Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) 2013, Future Directions for NSW 
Local Government - Twenty Essential Steps, ILGRP, Sydney. 
Jones S. and Walker, R. 2007, ‘Explanators of Local Government Distress’, ABACUS, 43, 3: 
396-418. 
Kim, J. and Mueller, C. 1978. Factor Analysis – Statistical Methods and Practical Issues, 
Sage University Series, California. 
 21 
 
Kloha P., C. Weissert and Kleine, R. 2005, ‘Someone to Watch Over Me: State Monitoring 
of Local Fiscal Conditions’, American Review of Public Administration, 35, 3: 236-255. 
Merenda P. 1997, ‘A Guide to the Proper Use of Factor Analysis in the Conduct and 
Reporting of Research: Pitfalls to Avoid’, Measurement and Evaluation in Counselling and 
Development, 30, 3: 156-164. 
Office of Local Government (OLG) 2014, Fit for the Future – A Blueprint for the Future of 
Local Government, OLG, Sydney. 
Peterson R. 2000, ‘A Meta-Analysis of Variance Accounted for and Factor Loadings in 
Exploratory Factor Analysis’, Marketing Letters, 11, 3: 261-275. 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) 2006, National Financial Sustainability Study of Local 
Government, PWC, Sydney. 
TCorp 2013, Financial Sustainability of the New South Wales Local Government Sector, 
TCorp, Sydney. 
Willis K., N. Powe and Garrod, G. 2005, ‘Estimating the Value of Improved Street Lighting: 
A Factor Analytical Discrete Choice Approach’, Urban Studies, 42, 12: 2289-2303. 
Wilson J. ‘Comprehensive Performance Assessment – Springboard or Dead-Weight?’ Public 
Money & Management, 24, 1: 63-68. 
Zwick W. and Velicer, W. 1986, ‘Comparison of Five Rules for Determining the Number of 





Table 1: Definitions and Measures of Central Tendency of Regression Variables  
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Factor Variables    
Operating ratio  (operating revenue† - operating 
expenses) / operating revenue†. 
Benchmark > -4.0%. 
-6.818 9.833 
Own Source Revenue 
ratio  
rates, utilities and charges / total 





current assets less restrictions / 
current liabilities less specific 
purpose liabilities. Benchmark 
> 1.5. 
3.601 2.202 
Interest Cover ratio  EBITDA / interest expense. 




estimated cost to bring assets to 
a satisfactory condition / total 
infrastructure assets. 
Benchmark < 0.02. 
0.129 0.142 
Debt ratio  EBITDA / (principal 
repayments + borrowing costs). 




annual capital expenditure / 
annual depreciation. Benchmark 
> 1.1. 
1.204 0.702 
Cash Expense ratio  (current cash and equivalents / 
(total expenses - depreciation - 
interest costs)) x 12. Benchmark 
> 3.0 months. 
5.128 4.744 
Asset Renewal ratio  Asset renewals / depreciation of 
building and infrastructure 




actual asset maintenance / 
required asset maintenance. 
Benchmark > 1.0. 
0.882 0.555 
Regressors    
 
Population (ln) natural log of resident 
population 
9.959 1.372 
Population density (ln) natural log of population 
density 
2.952 3.314 
% population under 15 
years 
proportion of residents under 15 
years of age 
19.468 2.531 
% population over 65 
years 
proportion of residents over 65 
years of age 
16.503 4.191 
% population ATSI 
(ln) 
natural log of proportion of 





% population NESB 
(ln) 
natural log of proportion of 
people speaking a language 
other than English at home 
1.566 1.207 
Unemployment rate unemployment rate for the 
council area 
5.607 1.854 
Average wage (taxable 
individuals) 
average wage of taxable 
individuals 
56850 17357 
Length of Roads (ln) natural log of the total length of 
roads maintained by the council 
(kms) 
6.580 0.863 
† revenue excludes capital grants and contributions 
‡ revenue includes capital grants and contributions 
 
Table 2: Eigenvalues of Unrotated Factor Analysis 
Factors Eigenvalue 
Factor 1  1.642 
Factor 2 1.179 
Factor 3 0.993 
Factor 4 0.410 
Factor 5 0.220 
Factor 6 0.010 
 
Table 3: Significant Factor Loading for a 3 Latent Factor Model 
Factors Factor Loading 
(orthogonal) 
Factor Loading (oblique) 
Factor 1 Disadvantage/Legacy 
of Previous Budgets 
  
Interest Cover ratio 0.895 0.891 
Debt ratio 0.873 0.879 
Factor 2 Size/Scale   
Unrestricted ratio  0.641 0.642 
Own Source ratio -0.474 -0.474 
Cash Expense ratio 0.524 0.522 
Asset maintenance 0.388 0.392 
Factor 3 Management   
Operating ratio 0.520 0.520 
Asset renewal ratio 0.618 0.619 


















Population (ln)* Average wage** Population 
(ln)** 
Density (ln)*** Over 65 years*  Business (ln)** 
NESB (ln)** Density (ln)**   





   
Total roads 
(ln)*** 
   
R2 = 0.307 R2 = 0.641 R2 = 0.221 R2 = 0.100 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
